論文：Assess tax in mixed oligopoly model under strategic of managerial delegation

Assess ta* in mi*ed oligopoly model under strategic of managerial delegation ——— based on Non-Profit Firm

Abstruct：Recalling the literature, in the operational efficiency of non-profit firm (NPF) than profit-ma*imizing firm (PMF) under the assumption that NPF as the economy in general, and there is no distinction between PMF s. This article is the assumption that the rela*ation will take into account NPF as its own profits and consumer surplus economies. Consideration of NPF to join its management authorized choice of the manager, through the design of a general counter-demand function of three-stage non-cooperative games, solving the sub-game perfect equilibr
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l derivate from profit-ma*imization. This paper is concerned specifically with strategic of managerial incentive and implications for assess ta* in international trade policy.
In the business world there is growing realization that managerial performance is a major key to the overall performance of the firm. In general managerial performance is dependent upon managerial effort as well as strategic delegation of price and quantity setting decisions to managers. So that this paper deals with how trade policy in particularly assessing ta* affects the incentive to managers and how optimal ta* may be designed in the light of changes in managerial incentive contracts. Strategic managerial delegation[ Strategic of managerial delegation refers to the design of an incentive payment scheme to the manager to deal with oligopolistic rivalry in the market, independent of considerations like moral hazard or adverse selection(Vickers (1985),Fershtman and Judd(1987),Sklivas(1987) and Katz(1991))] has some basic implications including that delegation itself is a profit-shifting mechanism and it affects the elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost. Comparing to the standard profit –ma*imizing case, the elasticity with strategic delegation is greater in the Cournot competition model and less in the Betrand competition model. However in integration case strategic managerial incentive tends to reduce gains.
Since the current analysis is only applicable to NPF with a significant commercial aspect, in this paper we analysis to NPF which is concerned about consumer surplus. we consider a mi*ed oligopoly setting is e*amined where a single private non-profit firm(NPF) whose ma*imizes the sum of its own profits and consumers’ surplus is engaged in competition with a private profit-ma*imizing firm(PMF). The owner of the NPF select the managerial incentive for their manager. All the return to the NPF owner are captured with a unique specification of the NPF’ objective function. The profits of the NPF as well as the NPF owner consumer surplus are included in NPF’ objective function. Note that NPF in this paper is different from traditional public-private mi*ed oligopoly model where the objective function of typically the public firm is ma*imization of generalized social welfare. Moreover ……（未完，全文共16593字，當(dāng)前僅顯示2984字，請閱讀下面提示信息。收藏《論文：Assess ta* in mi*ed oligopoly model under strategic of managerial delegation》）